

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JIDDA 04616 211641Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----012750 211645Z /41

O 211455Z JUN 78

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2440

S E C R E T JIDDA 4616

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, SA, XF

SUBJECT: TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST PEACE: A FIELD ANALYSIS WITH  
SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA

1. EMBASSY JIDDA HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF THE POSSI-  
BILITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE. WHILE OUR  
POINTS OF VIEW MAY BE PAROCHIAL, WE SUBMIT THEM FOR WHATEVER  
MERIT THEY MAY HAVE.

2. ASSUMPTIONS. OUR ANALYSIS IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING  
ASSUMPTIONS:

1) THAT THE RECENT ISRAELI ANSWERS TO THE AMERICAN  
QUESTIONS POINT UP THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE STALEMATE WHICH  
HAS CHARACTERIZED THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE FORMAL SESSIONS  
OF THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIOAN COMMITTEES ENDED IN JANUARY. THERE  
IS LITTLE HOPE OF BREAKING THAT STALEMATE WITHOUT SOME NEW  
AND FRESH INITIATIVE.

2) THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE SOME SUCH INITIATIVE  
TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. SUCH AN INITIATIVE  
MUST BE UNDERTAKEN SOON IN ORDER TO:

(A) MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE GOOD WILL GENERATED IN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 04616 211641Z

THE ARAB WORLD BY THE SUCCESS OF THE AIRCRAFT SALES  
PACKAGE;

(B) PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SADAT'S DOMESTIC  
POSITION:

(C) DEFUSE THE WORSENING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARABS

AND ISRAELIS, RECOGNIZING THAT A CONTINUED DETERIOR-  
ATION CAN LEAD TO ARMED CONFLICT.

3) THAT THE MOST SENSITIVE AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE ARE THE RELATED QUESTIONS OF THE  
WEST BANK AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. NO PEACE  
WILL BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT SOLUTION OF THESE KEY ISSUES;  
BUT GIVEN A SOLUTION TO THESE CENTRAL PROBLEMS, OTHER  
ISSUES, SUCH AS SINAI AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, WILL BECOME  
SOLVABLE.

3. AN OVERALL U.S. PLAN: A MISTAKE. WE BELIEVE THAT PRE-  
SENTING A U.S. PLAN FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT IS  
NOT THE BEST WAY TO BREAK THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING STALE-  
MATE. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE ROGERS PLAN AND MORE RE-  
CENTLY WITH NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO  
RIYADH IN JANUARY INDICATE THAT ANY PLAN WITH MERIT WILL  
BE OPPOSED BY ISRAEL AND WILL HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY  
ATTRACTING THE SUPPORT OF EVEN THE MODERATE ARAB STATES.  
THE DIVISIONS CREATED BY SUCH A PLAN (I.E. BETWEEN  
THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS, AND AMONG  
THE ARAB STATES THEMSELVES) WILL LEAD TO ENDLESS HAGGLING  
OVER SECONDARY ISSUES AND WILL LEAVE THE MAIN PROBLEMS  
UNRESOLVED. THE U.S. WILL FIND ITSELF IN THE POSITION OF  
A WELL-MEANING MEDIATOR BETWEEN A FEUDING HUSBAND AND  
WIFE; NOTHING IS ACCOMPLISHED EXCEPT THAT BOTH PARTIES  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 04616 211641Z

TURN THEIR WRATH UPON THE PEACEMAKER.

4. IT SEEMS TO US THAT ANY U.S. PLAN WOULD HAVE TO BE  
MODELED ON THE ASWAN STATEMENT. BUT THE FACT THAT AT  
RIYADH IN JANUARY THE SAUDIS REFUSED TO ENDORSE PUBLICLY  
A STATEMENT EVEN MORE FAVORABLE TO THE ARAB CAUSE THAN  
THE ASWAN FORMULA INDICATES THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING  
GENERAL ARAB SUPPORT, EVEN FROM THE MODERATE STATES, FOR  
A U.S. PLAN, HOWEVER WELL-INTENTIONED, SUBTLE, AND INGENIOUS.

5. WE CANNOT IMAGINE THE U.S. FORMULATING A PLAN WHICH  
THE SAUDIS OR THE OTHER ARAB STATES WILL SUPPORT PUBLICLY.  
SAUDI SILENCE ON THE SADAT INITIATIVE IS A CLEAR SIGN TO  
US THAT THEY WILL NEVER GET OUT IN FRONT OF THEIR ARAB  
BROTHERS IN SUPPORT OF AN AMERICAN-SPONSORED PEACE PLAN.  
ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT OBJECT TO  
ANYTHING ACCEPTABLE TO THE THREE CONFRONTATION STATES AND  
WOULD PROBABLY GO TO GREAT LENGTHS PRIVATELY TO BRING  
ABOUT SUCH A CONSENSUS. BUT SEEKING SAUDI ENDORSEMENT FOR  
A U.S. PLAN MAY WELL BE IN EFFECT ASKING THEM TO CHOOSE  
BETWEEN ARAB SOLIDARITY AND U.S. FRIENDSHIP--AN  
UNCOMFORTABLE CHOICE FOR BOTH OF US.

6. AN INITIAL SUGGESTED APPROACH--A U.S. PROPOSAL TO RESUME NEGOTIATION. TO AVOID THE PITFALLS OF A U.S.-SPONSORED PLAN AND TO AVOID GETTING ENTANGLED IN ENDLESS DEBATES ON PERIPHERAL ISSUES, WE PROPOSE FIRST THAT THE U.S. AIM FOR A DIRECT SOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE BY WORKING FOR A DILINEATION OF INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS--WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON ISRAEL'S EASTERN BOUNDARY. IN EFFECT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD REAFFIRM RESOLUTION 242 AS THE BASIC GUIDELINE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND PROPOSE THAT THE PARTIES SEEK FIRST TO DEFINE THE EVENTUAL INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE THE U.S. SEEKING  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 JIDDA 04616 211641Z

THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND AVOIDING THE TRAP OF SPONSORING AN OVERALL PLAN.

7. THE ATTRACTION OF ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES FIRST IS THAT OTHER, SECONDARY PROBLEMS--SETTLEMENTS, SECURITY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD--CAN BE NEGOTIATED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS. ONCE THE BOUNDARIES ARE ESTABLISHED THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE GAINED INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND THE ARAB SIDE WILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO OFFER DURING SUBSEQUENT BARGAINING IN THE WAY OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION, COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES, AND POSSIBLY EVEN ECONOMIC AID AND INVESTMENT FROM THE OIL-PRODUCING STATES.

8. THE ABOVE APPROACH ALSO PROVIDES A MEANS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS. THEY CAN BE TOLD AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT ESTABLISHING SECURE AND PERMANENT BORDERS IS PROBABLY THE ONLY WAY THEY WILL BE ABLE TO GAIN SMALL AMOUNTS OF TERRITORY TO IMPROVE THEIR BORDER SECURITY OVER WHAT IT WAS BEFORE JUNE 1967. IF THEY OBJECT TO THIS PROPOSAL, THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE UNITED STATES SEES A MULTI-NATIONAL APPROACH INVOLVING ONE OF TWO ALTERNATIVES AS THE ONLY REMAINING AVENUE TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. THESE ALTERNATIVES ARE: (1) A RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE; OR (2) REFERRING THE MATTER TO THE UN FOR A TOTAL OR PARTIAL SOLUTION.

9. RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IS PROBABLY THE MORE FEASIBLE OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES BECAUSE THE MECHANICS ARE GENERALLY SPELLED OUT AND MUCH OF THE GROUND WORK LAID LAST YEAR IS STILL AVAILABLE. THE FACT THAT THE SAUDIS PREFER THIS APPROACH IS A DEFINITE PLUS. THE MAJOR  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 JIDDA 04616 211641Z

OBSTACLE OTHER THAN ISRAELI OBJECTIONS, IS RECONCILING  
SADAT AND ASSAD, BUT WITH JOINT US-SAUDI EFFORTS, SUCH  
PROBABLY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.

10. THE TOTHER ALTERNATIVE IS REFERRING THE MATTER BACK TO  
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR EITHER (A) FURTHER CLARIFICATION  
OF 242 OR (B) A GENERAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. THIS  
APPROACH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PROVOKE STRONG OPPOSITION FROM  
ISRAEL; HOWEVER, THE UN IS STILL THE RECOGNIZED ORGANI-  
ZATION TO SETTLE MAJOR DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS. UP TO THIS  
TIME, ISRAEL HAS BEEN PROTECTED FROM THE FULL FORCE OF THE  
CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD OPINION BY THE CONSISTENT SUPPORT,  
INCLUDING USE OF VETO, OF ITS FRIEND AND ALLY, THE U.S.  
WITHOUT SUCH SOLID SUPPORT, EVEN THE INTRANSIGENT BEGIN  
SHOULD SEE THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL.  
WEST

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** REPORTS, PALESTINIANS, CHEROKEE 06/21/78, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, BOUNDARIES, CAT-C  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 jun 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978JIDDA04616  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** OA  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** P850033-0129  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** JIDDA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780636/aaaabfhr.tel  
**Line Count:** 191  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** f98bb784-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 13 jul 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2268911  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST PEACE: A FIELD NALYSIS WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA  
**TAGS:** PEPR, PBOR, PORG, PDIP, US, SA, XF, UNSC  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/f98bb784-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014